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his philosophy; indeed, it is fair to conclude that Gorgias is deeply 
concerned with ‘not being’. But what, after all, is Gorgias’ ‘not 
being’? This paper aims to answer this crucial question, by taking 
into consideration Gorgias’ main texts (i.e. the Treatise, the Apology 
of Palamedes and the Encomium of Helen). Each of them provides a 
serious – although not always explicit – account of ‘not being’. 
Overall, the aim is to show that Gorgias’ account of ‘not being’ is not 
concerned with ‘non-existence’ at all. It is deeply concerned, 
however, with falsehood and language. The paper will, therefore, be 
structured as follows: in part 1, the Treatise and specifically the the 
first section of the Particular Proof will be addressed and its 
‘linguistic’ conception of ‘not-being’ fully exploited; in part 2, the 
Apology of Palamedes will be taken into account, in order to 
enucleate its ‘not-being-as-falsehood’ argument; the results from part 
1 and part 2 will allow us, in part 3, to provide an analysis of the 
Encomium of Helen which points at its underlying conception of ‘not-
being’. 





As is nowadays widely recognized, the nihilist reading of Gorgias’ 
thought is to be rejected, since it is clearly off-target. However, much 
is still to be done in order to provide a unified account of Gorgias’ 
‘not being’. Indeed, this paper is aimed precisely at answering the 
following question: ‘ultimately, what is Gorgias not being?’. 
Contrary to what might be expected, I will pursue my goal by taking 
into account not only the Peri tou me ontos, but also the Apology of 
Palamedes and the Encomium of Helen.1 This is due to the conviction 
 
1 Needless to say, I am not purporting to provide an exhaustive reading of these 
texts: I will be focusing solely on those aspects which are relevant for the present 
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that although the Peri tou me ontos is surely the most explicit (and 
thought-provoking) of Gorgias’ discussions on this matter, it is not 
his last word, i.e. it is not the only text where the ‘not being issue’ is 
addressed. In fact, ‘not being’ plays a crucial (if not ‘the main’) role 
in the Apology of Palamedes which revolves around Odysseus 
establishing ‘not being’ as it were or – from the epistemic point of 
view – ‘falsehood’ as if it were ‘true’. 
And what about the Encomium of Helen? At first glance, it seems 
that, as fascinating as it is, this text has nothing to do with ‘not being’ 
(and therefore that it has nothing to say about it), although one could 
stress that the whole story of Helen is a myth, and therefore that 
Gorgias is providing a speech which purports to denote a non-
existing entity. However, even rejecting this reading and assuming 
that it is clear that the Encomium of Helen is not concerned with ‘non-
existence’, it is clear that it is strongly concerned with both 
knowledge and falsehood. This is sufficient – or so I judge – for 
taking it into consideration as well. 
In view of this, I will begin by focusing on the first section of the 
Particular Proof arguing that its main point is that ‘not being’ is to 
be understood as a linguistic product which undermines the truth-
evaluability of language. Secondly, the Apology of Palamedes will 
be taken into account, in order to explain how and to what extent the 
‘epistemic’ notion of ‘not being’ that is here fully addressed both 
confirms and dismisses the picture drawn in the Particular Proof. 
Such an analysis of both the Particular Proof and the Apology of 
Palamedes should allow us to shed new light on the conception of 
‘not being’ that arises from the Encomium of Helen, to which the third 
section is devoted. Finally, the main conclusions will be briefly 
recalled. 
 
discussion. In doing so, though it pains me to do so, I will be forced to leave many 
other significant issues aside. 
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1.The Particular Proof: on ‘not being’ from the 
linguistic point of view 
If one is looking for some intriguing (if not paradoxical) discussion 
on ‘not-being’, the first thesis of Gorgias’ Peri tou me ontos 
(hereinafter the Treatise) is the philosophical piece to read. 
One of the most debated and controversial textual sections is the 
Particular Proof – with its sharp and ambiguous incipit: ‘nothing is’.2 
More precisely, according to the author of MXG, by means of the 
first thesis, Gorgias aims to show that οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε εἶναι οὔτε μὴ 
εἶναι.3 
Since my aim in this paper is to address only the first section of the 
Particular Proof, it might be convenient firstly to set out the full text 
here:4 
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἧττον 
τὸ μὴ ὂν τοῦ ὄντος εἴη. Τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν ἔστι μὴ ὄν, 
καὶ τὸ ὂν ὄν, ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ οὐκ εἶναι τὰ 
πράγματα. 
Actually, if not being is not being, what-is-not would 
be nothing less than what-is. Indeed, what-is-not is 
 
2 According to the author of MXG, Gorgias claims: ‘Οὐκ εἶναί φησιν οὐδέν· εἰ 
δ’ἔστιν, ἄγνωστον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστι καὶ γνωστόν, ἀλλ’οὐ δηλωτὸν ἄλλοις’; along 
the same lines, Sextux Empiricus: ‘ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ 
Περὶ φύσεως τρία κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς κεφάλαια κατασκευάζει, ἓν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι 
οὐδὲν ἔστιν, δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ, τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ 
καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας’. 
3 According to Sextus, Gorgias would be arguing for ‘nothing is’, by assuming that 
‘if (something) is, either it is what-is or it is what-is-not or it is what-is-not and 
what-is at the same time’ (εἰ γὰρ ἔστι, ἤτοι τὸ ὂν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὂν ἔστι 
καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν) in order to show that neither is possible. Indeed, it is reasonable to 
conclude that this tripartite division is Sextus’ arrangement of the text, in 
accordance with the skeptic logic framework; cf. Ioli (2013, 182-183). 
4 All translations are my own. 
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what-is-not and what-is is what-is, so that things no 
more are than they are not.5 
As is well-known, the Treatise is one of the most difficult texts in 
ancient philosophy and even its philosophical import has long been 
questioned. In recent decades a strong rehabilitative process 
regarding Gorgias’ thought has made it possible to stop considering 
him simply as an orator unconcerned with any serious philosophical 
issues, thus allowing scholarship to reevaluate his texts – at least 
partially. 
A major step towards the correct evaluation of the first thesis of the 
Treatise (and of its philosophical import) is represented by the 
‘logical-linguistic reading’, according to which the Particular Proof 
would not be devoted to undermining the ontological consistency of 
the Eleatic ‘Being’ and ‘Not Being’; on the contrary, it would be 
concerned with the ontological status of everyday things as it arises 
from our speaking of them. 
The reading provided by George Kerferd (1955, 16) is paradigmatic: 
Gorgias was not concerned to deny the existence of 
Being or Not-Being at all. What he was concerned 
with was the status of the phenomena, which are quite 
plainly the subject of the discourse in the second and 
third divisions of the treatise where he argues that if 
anything is it cannot be known, if it can be known it 
cannot be communicated to others human beings. 
What he is saying is that the verb “to be” cannot be 
used of phenomena either positively or negatively 
without contradiction resulting. The question 
confronting us is this: is it possible to say of something 
that it is not? 
The basic idea is that Gorgias is not dismissing the Eleatic ‘Being’ 
qua the basic or fundamental entity; he is actually questioning the 
 
5 Taking a different approach, Sextus’ version claims that ‘certainly what-is-not is 
not. Indeed, if what-is-not is, it will be and will be not at the same time’ (καὶ δὴ τὸ 
μὲν μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἔστιν. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστιν, ἔσται τε ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἔσται). 
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Eleatic logical-linguistic presumptions, by drawing attention to their 
intrinsic, although unrecognized, inconsistency. 
Assuming a linguistic point of view is in fact crucial, insofar as, while 
in the nihilist view reality is taken as fundamentally problematic, in 
the logical-linguistic view, on the contrary, the focus is not on reality, 
but on how reality is displayed in language: the problem is therefore 
placed on the logical-linguistic level. Accordingly, Gorgias would 
thus deserve credit for having pointed out that the Eleatic verb ‘to be’ 
actually leads to the impossibility of speaking coherently of reality. 
Even though it leads, overall, to various and different conclusions, 
this is by far the dominant view. As Jaap Mansfeld (1988, 256) put 
it: ‘one thing is sufficiently clear: the “particular proof” turns on the 
equivocalness of the expression “to be”. (…) Gorgias, as we would 
put it, does not distinguish between the existential, or referential, 
sense of “to be” (…), and the predicative sense, viz. that of the 
copula, or of identity’.6 According to Mario Untersteiner (1966, 221), 
Gorgias aims to show that reality is doomed to arise contradictorily 
in language, due to the intrinsic ambiguity of language itself. 
Giuseppe Mazzara (1982, 43) identifies the main issue of the first 
thesis with the problem of falsehood as it will later be addressed by 
Plato in the Sophist. In Giovanni Casertano’s view, the Treatise is 
rejecting the Eleatic identity between ‘being’ and ‘thinking’, showing 
 
6 In this respect, with the notable exception of George Kerferd, who individuates 
the core of the argument in the (im)possibility of predication, without insisting 
particularly on the existential value, scholars provide a unified account. The first 
to draw attention to the confused use of the verb ‘to be’ was Guido Calogero (1977, 
194): ‘l’argomentazione propria di Gorgia fa dunque perno, secondo la chiara 
esposizione dell’Anonimo, sull’ambiguità del concetto dell’essere, per un verso 
predicativo e per un verso esistenziale’. This reading is further advanced by Patricia 
Curd (2006, 188) who claims that: ‘there are, then, two possibilities. First, Gorgias 
might be maliciously running together two senses of “to be” (…). This would 
support the view that his intention is destructive, humorous, or “sophistical” in the 
platonic sense. On the other hand, he might be intentionally exploiting an 
ambiguity inherent but latent in the Eleatic use of “to be”, in order to make a serious 
point about the import of Parmenides’ argument. I suggest that the latter alternative 
is correct’. More recently, both Mauro Bonazzi (2010, 43) and Roberta Ioli (2010, 
30-31) put a huge emphasis on the ‘equivocality’ of the Eleatic verb ‘to be’. 
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that the relation between reality and language is not, so to speak, 
symmetrical, insofar as it is always language that establishes and 
leads that relation7. According to Roberta Ioli (2013, 29) the Treatise 
investigates the problematic relation between language, thought and 
reality by means of a polemic discussion with the Eleatic philosophy. 
A notable exception is the reading advanced by Patricia Curd (2006) 
who claims that, while it is clear that the Synthetic Argument aims to 
show that ‘whatever is turns out to have contradictory predicates’ 
(2006, 196), the Particular Proof would actually be taking into 
account ‘being’ and ‘not being’ qua basic entities.8 Gorgias’ aim 
would then be to include ‘not being’ in the catalogue of entities. In 
fact: 
Parmenides had argued that if it is true that «X is F» 
then X is wholly, completely and unchangingly F. 
Gorgias could here respond that «what-is-not» names 
what is wholly, completely and unchangingly what-is-
not. It is, then, what not-being ‘is’. Because it is the 
nature of what-is-not, it is just as much a thing that is 
real as Parmenides’ to eon (what-is), because it has (or 
is) an essence or nature, (Curd 2006, 189). 
This reading (that we might, perhaps, define as ‘metaphysical’) relies 
upon the omission of the last sentence of the Particular Proof, i.e. 
 
7‘la distinzione tra il livello della realtà e il livello del discorso sulla realtà non 
esprime un rapporto per così dire “paritetico”, né tanto meno una corrispondenza 
pacificamente data, dal momento che essa avviene e non può non avvenire, 
esclusivamente su uno solo dei livelli: è sempre infatti solo il nostro linguaggio che 
stabilisce il rapporto tra linguaggio e realtà, differenziandoli e connettendoli’, G. 
Casertano, Da Parmenide di Elea al Parmenide di Platone, Eleatica 2011, ed. by 
Gambetti F., Giombini S. (Academia Verlag: Sankt Augustin, 2015), 56-57. 
Further, the fact that it is not reality but our knowledge of it that is problematic is 
also assumed by the ‘phenomenological reading’ (such as Kerferd’s and 
Untersteiner’s) which takes experiences, not reality, as intrinsically ambiguous. 
8 ‘the suggestion, by some recent scholars (notably Mansfeld and Palmer), that 
Gorgias is attacking the basic entities of the early Greek philosophers rather than 
what we might think of as the ordinary content of everyday experience is I think 
correct (…)’, Curd (2006, 186). 
8 Rev. Archai (ISSN: 1984-249X), n. 31, Brasília, 2021, e03126. 
 
‘ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ οὐκ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα’; that is, the 
omission of the reference to ‘τὰ πράγματα’. 
Following the common view, I cannot see any serious reason for 
following Curd and Mansfeld (1988, 258) along this path and 
omitting this sentence. In spite of this, it seems to me that Patricia 
Curd highlighted a truly remarkable point in claiming: ‘Gorgias could 
here respond that “what-is-not” names what is wholly, completely 
and unchangingly what-is-not’, thus implying that it is language that 
brings ‘what-is-not’ to life. Briefly, it is due to the act of naming that 
‘not being’ comes to be. Let me be very clear on this: I completely 
agree with Curd maintaining that Gorgias’ argument leads one to 
admit that even ‘not being’, in some sense, is; however, I wish to 
stress the linguistic (or meta-linguistic) character of the argument. 
Let me spell this out. 
The argument’s starting point is an ‘innocent’ judgment of identity: 
‘τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔστι μὴ εἶναι’ (not being is not being). From this, Gorgias 
can easily draw his conclusions: since ‘not being’ is ‘not being’, it is 
something; therefore, ‘not being’ is as much as ‘being’ is, so that 
‘being’ and ‘not being’ cannot ultimately be distinguished. As I 
mentioned, according to the dominant view, Gorgias’ merit would lie 
in the fact that he is pointing at the ‘semantic confusion’ behind the 
Eleatic verb ‘to be’, conflating existential and predicative meanings. 
I would say that, leaving Parmenides aside for a moment,9 the first 
argument clearly shows that once we take ‘not being’ as the subject 
of any linguistic sentence – in this case, as the subject of a judgment 
of identity – we are forced to ascribe (or we have already ascribed) 
‘being’ to it. In other words, if ‘what-is-not’ can be talked about – 
even just by saying that it is self-identical – ‘what-is-not’ is (first 
step); if ‘what-is-not’ is, then it is just as much as ‘what-is’ and 
therefore it exists (second step). In light of this, if both ‘what-is’ and 
‘what-is-not’ are (and exist), existential propositions are not truth-
 
9 In saying so, I am not suggesting that Parmenides’ philosophy is not relevant here; 
I am just highlighting that the philosophical import of Gorgias’ argument goes 
beyond it. 
 WHAT IS GORGIAS’ ‘NOT BEING’? 9 
 
evaluable and since, further, any proposition whatsoever actually is, 
or presumes, an existential one, the conclusion is, more radically, that 
no proposition is in fact truth-evaluable. 
Overall, the first section relies on the conflating of both ‘being’ and 
‘existing’ and of the ‘ontological’ and ‘linguistic’ levels. That is, as 
Curd implicitly suggested, it is by naming ‘what-is-not’, that I make 
it come to be. This being so, Gorgias argues, it is no more legitimate 
to say of things that they are than to claim that they are not: indeed, 
in language both of them – both ‘being’ and ‘not being’, both 
‘Athens’ and ‘Pegasus’ – are, in the sense that I can perfectly say that 
‘Pegasus exists’ just as much as I can perfectly say that ‘Athens 
exists’. 
In view of this, regarding our main concern, i.e. ‘not being’, it might 
be said that – whether he is pointing at Parmenides or not – Gorgias’ 
main claim (at least, in the Particular Proof) is that ‘not-being’ is an 
unpleasant yet necessary, i.e. unavoidable, product of language. This 
is a common-yet-still-puzzling-place in philosophy, after all. In fact, 
we can easily claim that the history of philosophy is full of attempts 
to meet Gorgias’ challenge, in that it is full of attempts to account for 
a ‘non-ontologically committing’ conception of ‘not being’, such that 
I can speak perfectly well of ‘Pegasus’ without being forced to admit 
Pegasus itself into my catalogue of entities.10 
 
10 Indeed, and presumably not casually, that of ‘not being’ as ‘unavoidable fact of 
language’ is the starting-point of Plato’s Sophist. In 237b-239a, Plato explicitly 
addresses the puzzling notion of ‘not being’ or, more precisely, of τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν, 
firstly recognizing that it cannot be avoided. Indeed, in whatever reading, this 
passage assumes ‘not being’ as something that cannot be denied, for even by 
denying it, we end up to affirm it. For an elegant and detailed discussion of this 
passage, see the recent contribution by Francesco Aronadio (2018). 
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2. The Apology of Palamedes: on ‘not being’ 
from the epistemic point of view 
The picture drawn in the Treatise is both confirmed and dismissed in 
the Apology of Palamedes (hereinafter, Palamedes). Let me spell this 
out. 
Here, Odysseus accuses Palamedes of betraying Greece, so 
Palamedes has to prove his innocence. In making the false 
accusation, Odysseus establishes ‘not being’ as it were. Indeed, not 
only does Odysseus easily speak of ‘what-is-not’, but also Palamedes 
(even though he emphases the difficulty in speaking about what he 
did not do), in order to escape the accusation, is forced to provide a 
defense which hypothetically assumes that the betrayal did actually 
occur – even though it did not. In the end, both Odysseus and 
Palamedes do speak of ‘what-is-not’.11 This being so, the conception 
of ‘not-being’ as ‘the result of a linguistic act’ or, briefly, as linguistic 
content is endorsed in the Palamedes. In fact, just as in the first 
section of the Particular Proof the result is the impossibility of 
establishing and identifying the ontological status of things, so in the 
Palamedes the jurors – who should establish whether Palamedes is 
innocent or not – cannot distinguish the onto-epistemic status of 
Palamedes’ and Odysseus’ speeches: ‘not-being’ and ‘being’, ‘truth’ 
and ‘falsehood’, are, linguistically, the same.12 
 
11 Along these lines, and even more radically, Giombini (2012, 210) explains: ‘Da 
notare che, mentre Palamede accusa Odisseo di parlare secondo una doxa in 
negativo, di fatto l’eroe procede allo stesso modo quando, a causa della mancanza 
di prove, chiede ai giudici di credere anche a lui solo in virtù della sua doxa’. 
12 This is hugely emphasized by Mazzara (1982, 45): ‘di fronte ai Giudici le parole 
di Palamede valgono quanto quelle di Ulisse’. In greater detail, Mazzara explains 
that ‘quello che nell’Opera filosofica si trova a livello di schema di confutazione 
teorica, nel Palamede si ritrova a livello di applicazione concreta’, (1982, 43; 
emphasis in the original). Mazzara (1982, 47-48) draws an explicit connection 
between the three theoretical positions in the Palamedes (i.e. that of the accuser, 
that of the accused and that of the juries) and the three meanings that can be 
attributed to the main proposition of the Particular Proof, i.e. ‘if not being is not 
being’: ‘1) nel caso dei Giudici essa è pienamente e soltanto copulativa e, in quanto 
è frutto di un atteggiamento di equidistanza tanto dall’accusa quanto dalla difesa, 
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This is not the whole story, though. Contrary to the Particular Proof, 
the Palamedes adds something very significant. 
In Pal. 5, Palamedes exclaims: ‘οὐδὲ οἶδ’ὅπως ἂν εἰδείη τις ὂν τὸ μὴ 
γενόμενον!’. This brief sentence is most interesting. It might be 
translated as follows: ‘nor do I see how someone could see that it is 
something that did not happen’. 13  However, bearing in mind the 
veridical sense of the Greek verb ‘to be’,14 we might take it as saying 
something along these lines: ‘I cannot see how someone could see as 
true something that did not happen’. In any case, the main point is 
that Palamedes is claiming that ‘what-did-not-happen’ (τὸ μὴ 
γενόμενον) cannot be known (ὅπως ἂν εἰδείη τις) as obtaining (ὂν), 
i.e. it cannot be taken as the object of knowledge, where ‘knowing’ 
is taken as ‘seeing’ or as its result. As such, ‘what did not happen’, 
i.e. ‘what-is-not’ is therefore linked to ‘falsehood’. Hence, while in 
the Particular Proof ‘not being’ is understood as what undermines 
the truth-evaluability of any proposition whatsoever, here in the 
Palamedes, ‘what-is-not’ is taken as ‘what cannot be seen as true’, 
i.e. as ‘falsehood’. My aim in what follows is to spell this out. 
In Pal. 23, Palamedes points to the fact that neither he himself nor 
Odysseus have been able to provide eye-witnesses of what is 
supposed to have happened, emphasizing that while it is impossible 
for him to provide eye-witnesses of what did not happen, it would 
have been easy for Odysseus to provide eye-witnesses – even false 
ones! – of what he claims it happened: 
 
le possibilità che si risolva in una esistenziale affermativa (“il non essere è”) oppure 
in una esistenziale negativa (“il non essere non è”) sono pari; 2) nel caso di Ulisse 
essa è “intenzionata” a trasformarsi (…) in una proposizione esistenziale 
affermativa (“il non essere è”); 3) nel caso di Palamede, infine, essa è 
“intenzionata” a trasformarsi in una proposizione esistenziale negativa (“il non 
essere non è”)’.  
13 I choose to translate ‘οἶδα’ with ‘seeing’ instead of ‘knowing’, which would 
probably be more correct, in order to emphasize the visual or perceptive account of 
knowledge the verb ‘οἶδα’ seems to nod toward. 
14 The topic of the ‘veridical sense of Greek verb to be’ is a common place in the 
literature. I will therefore confine myself to mentioning Charles Khan (1966). 
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Φήσεις ἴσως ἴσον εἶναι τὸ σέ γε τῶν γενομένων, ὡς σὺ 
φήις, μὴ παρέχεσθαι μάρτυρας, τῶν δὲ μὴ γενομένων 
ἐμέ. Τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἴσον ἐστί· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀγένητά πως 
ἀδύνατα μαρτυρηθῆναι, περὶ δὲ τῶν γενομένων οὐ 
μόνον οὐκ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥάιδιον, οὐδὲ μόνον 
ῥάιδιον, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οὐκ ἦν οἷόν <τε> μόνον 
μάρτυρας ἀλλὰ καὶ ψευδομάρτυρας εὑρεῖν, ἐμοὶ δὲ 
οὐδέτερον εὑρεῖν τούτων δυνατόν. 
You will probably claim that the fact that you did not 
provide eye-witnesses of what, according to you, did 
happen is the same as myself not providing eye-
witnesses of what did not happen. However, it is not 
the same thing: indeed, it is absolutely not possible to 
eye-witness something that did not happen. On the 
contrary, regarding what actually happened, not only 
is it not impossible, but also easy and not only easy! 
In fact, not only would be it possible for you to find 
eye-witnesses, but also false eye-witnesses. Whereas, 
for me, it is impossible to find either of them.15 
The first striking point is that in neither of these passages does 
Palamedes affirm that he cannot formulate a speech, thus arguing that 
it is not possible to speak of ‘what-is-not’. That is, perhaps contra 
Parmenides,16 propositions which fail to denote are clearly not ruled 
out as impossible. Rather, Palamedes claims that ‘what-is-not’ cannot 
be known17  and, therefore, cannot be spoken of truly.18  In other 
words, a strong distinction between ‘speaking’ and ‘speaking truly’ 
is drawn. In this regard, Palamedes (and therefore Gorgias) is surely 
 
15 Indeed, Palamedes cannot provide witnesses to what he did not do (he did not 
betray), but he can, and in fact does, provide witnesses to everything he did for 
Greece, cf. Pal, 15. 
16 I say ‘perhaps’ because whether Parmenides did actually embrace such a position 
is highly controversial. 
17 Where ‘knowing’ is taken as ‘seeing’ or ‘observing’ as the insistence on ‘οἶδα’ 
and ‘εἶδον’ clearly shows. 
18  Where ‘speaking truly’ is taken as ‘reporting something which has been 
witnessed’ and therefore as ‘testifying’ or ‘attesting’. 
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faithful to Parmenides’ teaching, according to which, roughly, ‘m 
knows p, entails p’.19 
Briefly, from a philosophical point of view, ‘not being’ as ‘what-
cannot-be-spoken-of-truly’ is either ‘falsehood’ (if we are 
Russellian) 20  or something which is not truth-evaluable, i.e. a 
proposition which is neither true nor false, inasmuch as it is simply 
absurd (if we favor Strawson’s solution).21 While this latter might be, 
in some sense, the case of the Particular Proof where, as we have 
seen, the truth-evaluability of propositions is rejected, it is not, 
however, the case of the Palamedes, in that Odysseus’ ‘not-being’ is 
explicitly said to coincide with the false accusation: in this text ‘not-
being’ as ‘what-cannot-be-spoken-of-truly’ is nothing but 
‘falsehood’. Further, both ‘not-being’ and ‘falsehood’ belong to 
language: indeed, we might say that the former is the result of the 
latter, so that, according to the Palamedes, propositions which fail to 
denote, as I have already said, are not impossible or meaningless, but 
always false. 
The link between ‘falsehood’ and ‘not-being’ turns out to be 
fundamental in the second half of the Palamedes, where Palamedes 
tries to show neither that the fact did not occur nor that he is speaking 
truly; rather, he focuses on showing that Odysseus is speaking falsely, 
insofar as he speaks without possessing, or being grounded in 
knowledge. This is made clear in Pal. 24, where Palamedes claims: 
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶσθα ἃ κατηγορεῖς, φανερόν· τὸ δὴ 
λοιπὸν <οὐκ> εἰδότα σε δοξάζειν. Εἶτα, ὦ πάντων 
ἀνθρώπων τολμηρότατε, δόξηι πιστεύσας, 
ἀπιστοτάτωι πράγματι, τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ εἰδώς, 
 
19 As is widely recognized, this is the reading of the Poem provided by Charles 
Kahn (1969, 711): ‘Parmenides is making the obvious, but not entirely trivial claim 
that whatever we know, whatever can be known is – and must be – determinately 
so, that it must be actually the case in reality or in the world. If we restate 
Parmenides’ claim in the modern, formal mode, it might run “m knows that p” 
entails “p”. This claim would generally be regarded as non-controversial. It calls 
for no argument, and in fact Parmenides offers none’. 
20 Cf. Russell (1905). 
21 Cf. Strawson (1950). 
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τολμᾶις ἄνδρα περὶ θανάτου διώκειν; ὧι τί τοιοῦτον 
ἔργον εἰργασμένωι σύνοισθα; ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δοξάσαι 
κοινὸν ἅπασι περὶ πάντων, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν τούτωι σὺ τῶν 
ἄλλων σοφώτερος. ἀλλ’οὔτε τοῖς δοξάζουσι δεῖ 
πιστεύειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰδόσιν, οὔτε τὴν δόξαν τῆς 
ἀληθείας πιστοτέραν νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν τῆς δόξης. 
It is evident that you do not possess knowledge about 
what you are accusing me of. What is left is that even 
not knowing what is the case, you have an opinion. 
You, the bravest man, relying upon opinion which is 
the less reliable thing, not knowing what is the case – 
do you dare accuse a man of a crime which is punished 
with death? But this man, what do you know he did 
do? Indeed, possessing opinions on everything is 
common to everyone, such that you are no wiser than 
the others. But it is necessary not to trust those who 
possess opinions, but those who possess knowledge, 
nor to evaluate opinion as more reliable than truth, but 
on the contrary, truth as more reliable than opinion. 
This is, in fact, a crucial passage. Odysseus is said to have made an 
accusation on the basis of opinion which is further said occurring in 
the absence of knowledge, as is made explicit by both the expressions 
‘τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ εἰδώς’ and ‘τὸ δὴ λοιπὸν <οὐκ> εἰδότα σε 
δοξάζειν’. Finally, opinion is defined ‘ἀπιστοτάτον πράγμα’, i.e. the 
less faithful thing, even though it is recognized as being common to 
all. 
The main point here is that a link is clearly established between 
‘opinion’, ‘falsehood’ and ‘not being’: the betrayal-that-did-not-
occur (‘not being’) is the result of a false accusation (‘false speech-
act’) which has its basis in opinion (‘absence of knowledge’ – where 
‘knowledge’ is taken as ‘εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν’, i.e. as ‘seeing the 
truth’). 
Indeed, if we look back at Pal. 5, we will note that this link between 
‘falsehood’ and ‘opinion’ is already mentioned, even though not so 
explicitly: 
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οὐδὲ οἶδ’ὅπως ἂν εἰδείη τος ὂν τὸ μὴ γενόμενον. Εἰ δὲ 
οἰόμενος οὕτω ταῦτα ἔχειν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν κατηγορίαν, 
οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν διὰ δισσῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω τρόπων. 
Nor do I see how someone could see that it is 
something that did not happen. If he made the 
accusation believing that it is the case, I will show you, 
with a twofold argument, that he is not speaking 
truly.22 
Here, following the same line of reasoning developed in Pal. 24, 
Palamedes claims that it is not possible to know or to see ‘what-is-
not’, for ‘what-is-not’ can only be ‘believed to be’ or ‘supposed to 
be’ and, this being the case, Odysseus is simply not speaking truly. 
That is, ‘οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν’ is explicitly said to depend on ‘οἰόμενος’. 
To sum up, the Palamedes both confirms and dismisses the Treatise’s 
picture. On the one hand, ‘not being’ is perfectly sayable; further, the 
jurors cannot ascertain the truth-evaluability of Palamedes’ and 
Odysseus’ speeches: just as in the first section of the Particular Proof 
it is said that, since ‘not being’ can be spoken of, it is no more 
possible to say of things that they are than it is possible to say that 
they are not, so, in the Palamedes, the jurors cannot say of the 
betrayal that it did actually occur more than they can say that it did 
not. On the other hand, however, it does not seem possible to 
conclude that Odysseus’ and Palamedes’ propositions really are not 
truth-evaluable: on the contrary, it is clear that Odysseus (insofar as 
he does not know what is the case) is speaking falsely and therefore 
that Palamedes (who knows what is the case) is speaking the truth. 
 
22 This is rightly emphasized by Untersteiner (1996, 205) who explains: ‘solo di 
ciò che è accaduto si dà chiara conoscenza e quindi la verità; di ciò che non è 
accaduto si può fare solo una supposizione, atto quest’ultimo (…) che non merita 
fiducia alcuna di fronte alla formulazione della verità’. 
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3.The Encomium of Helen: on ‘not being’ from 
the epistemic point view (again) 
In the introduction I claimed that the remarks from both the 
Particular Proof and the Palamedes would allow us to grasp the 
conception of ‘not being’ underlying the Encomium of Helen 
(hereinafter, Helen). To be very clear, regarding ‘not being’ in the 
Helen, two readings are possible. 
On the first, we might acknowledge that the story of Helen is, after 
all, a myth – so that Helen is a fictional character and the Helen a 
fictional discourse.23 On the second view, neither is the woman Helen 
a fictional character, nor is the Helen a fictional discourse.24 If this 
latter is the case, however, it seems clear that the text does not have 
much to say about ‘not being’. In fact, while the Palamedes revolves 
around the false accusation made by Odysseus – which establishes 
‘not being’ as it were –, the Helen examines the reasons why Helen 
went to Troy, in order to show that, in any event, she is not to be 
blamed, but, on the contrary, should be seen as a victim. As such, 
Gorgias’ speech, we might say, is a denoting one, for it denotes, or 
refers to, a real, historical event. In view of this, it could be argued, 
 
23 Regarding ‘fictional discourse’, a huge variety of approaches is possible. For the 
sake of clarity, we might distinguish here between two main groups. In the first 
group there are those who take propositions referring to fictional entities simply as 
propositions which fail to denote; such propositions will be, typically, either false 
or neither false nor true (as I have already mentioned). In the second group, there 
are those who reckon that propositions which attempt to refer, but fail to do so, are 
quite different from propositions which are about, say, Santa Claus: the basic 
difference is that in this latter case I know that Santa Claus does not exist and I 
mean precisely to mention that ‘non-existing-Santa-Claus’. As such, one might 
argue further that propositions consciously referring to fictional entities do possess 
truth-value, thus implying that they can also be true. As is well-known, the 
difference between propositions which fail to denote and propositions which 
denote fictional character has been strongly remarked on by Keith S. Donnellan 
(1974). In recent years this approach has gained more and more interest, since it 
seems that it can better account for what is a common practice, after all. Tim Crane 
(2013) is nowadays one of its most enthusiast defenders. 
24 Note that these two readings are not mutually exclusive: it might be that the 
Helen is to be read with both these views in mind. 
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that, contrary to what I hinted at, there is no room for either ‘not 
being’ or ‘falsehood’. 
Nevertheless, recalling the Palamedes, we have seen that ‘not being’ 
is more precisely taken as ‘that which cannot be known’ inasmuch as 
‘it cannot be observed or eye-witnessed’. Incidentally, this is 
precisely the case of the Helen as well: no one saw what actually 
happened when Helen decided, or was forced to, go to Troy. That is, 
even though, contrary to the Palamedes, the event did occur, neither 
Gorgias nor his pupils (far less his readers) know – or can know – 
what actually happened. In other words, in this respect, whether the 
fact actually obtains or not is not so relevant: in both cases, the main 
point is that ‘knowledge’ as ‘seeing the truth’ is unattainable. 
In Pal. 5 and 24, as we have seen, a connection is drawn between 
‘lack of knowledge’ and ‘falsehood’: speeches arising from doxastic 
cognitive states are automatically false. In fact, Gorgias’ 
argumentation is an either/or-matter, i.e. either truth or falsehood, 
tertium non datur: it is the very fact that I am speaking without 
possessing knowledge that makes my speech false. That is to say, 
Gorgias does not seem to consider an in-between, so that opinion (i.e. 
absence of knowledge) is always identified with falsehood. 
Besides, the connection between ‘falsehood’ (or, better, ‘false 
speeches’) and ‘opinion’ is made explicit again in a famous passage 
from the Helen. In Hel. 11, Gorgias explains: 
ὅσοι δὲ ὅσους περὶ ὅσων καὶ ἔπεισαν καὶ πείθουσι δὲ 
ψευδῆ λόγον πλάσαντες. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ πάντες περὶ 
πάντων εἶχον τῶν <τε> παροιχομένων μνήμην τῶν τε 
παρόντων <ἔννοιαν> τῶν τε μελλόντων πρόνοιαν, οὐκ 
ἂν ὁμοίως ὅμοιος ὢν ὁ λόγος ἠ<πά>τα· νῦν δὲ οὔτε 
μνησθῆναι τὸ παροιχόμενον οὔτε σκέψασθαι τὸ 
παρὸν οὔτε μαντεύσασθαι τὸ μέλλον εὐπόρως ἔχει· 
ὥστε περὶ τῶν πλείστων οἱ πλεῖστοι τὴν δόξαν 
σύμβουλον τῆι ψυχῆι παρέχονται. ἡ δὲ δόξα σφαλερὰ 
καὶ ἀβέβαιος οὖσα σφαλεραῖς καὶ ἀβεβαίοις εὐτυχίαις 
περιβάλλει τοὺς αὐτῆι χρωμένους. 
How many people, producing a false speech, have 
persuaded and do persuade how many people on how 
many things. For if everyone, regarding anything, 
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possessed memory of the past, <insight> into the 
present and foreknowledge of the future, language, 
even being the same, would not deceive that way. 
However, it is easy neither remembering the past, nor 
investigating the present, nor foreseeing the future. 
Such that, most men, regarding most things, offer 
opinion to the soul as its guide. But opinion, being 
slippery and weak, in a fate slippery and weak destroys 
those who rely upon it.25 
Here, Gorgias explicitly links ‘opinion’ to ‘falsehood’, ‘persuasion’ 
and ‘deception’. This is the line of reasoning: since humans lack 
knowledge, i.e. they do not know what is in fact the case, – so that 
opinion turns out to be the common cognitive state – they end up as 
easy prey of both persuasion and deception, by means of false 
speeches.26 
All in all, while knowledge is understood as ‘seeing the truth’ and 
therefore as ‘direct’ or ‘perceptual’, opinion is taken as its opposite, 
i.e. as that cognitive state occurring in the absence of knowledge and 
therefore in the absence of direct contact with reality.27 This further 
means that while the object of knowledge is ‘what can be seen or 
observed’, ‘what cannot be seen or observed’ is the object of opinion.  
This reading is confirmed by another passage from the Helen, at 
paragraph 13, where Gorgias explains: 
 
25 This passage is in fact crucial, although I cannot fully address it here. I will 
confine myself to those remarks that are actually relevant for the present discussion. 
26  This is emphasized by Roberta Ioli (2018, 142-143), who remarks that: ‘In 
Hel.11 è il logos pseudos a ingannare ma, ancora una volta, non tanto a causa della 
propria intrinseca falsità, quanto per la debolezza epistemica dell’uomo che non ha 
“memoria del passato, conoscenza del presente e preveggenza del futuro” (la 
triplice facoltà propria di dei e indovini). Se così fosse, se cioè l’uomo fosse saggio 
e preveggente come un indovino, “il discorso pur essendo lo stesso non 
ingannerebbe allo stesso modo”. Ma l’uomo è fragile e il suo regno è quello della 
doxa’. This had been highlighted also by Giombini (2012, 118): ‘Gorgia non si 
sottrae al tentativo di risalire alla ragione per cui siamo tutti esposti alle lusinghe 
del logos falso: questo è possibile perché la nostra conoscenza è imperfetta’. 
27  This is acknowledged by Juan P. Bermudez (2017, 9) who highlights: 
‘knowledge seems to imply direct experience, whereas opinion turns out to be a 
speech that plays the role of knowledge when direct experience is not available’. 
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ὅτι δ’ ἡ πειθὼ προσιοῦσα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἐτυπώσατο ὅπως ἐβούλετο, χρὴ μαθεῖν πρῶτον μὲν 
τοὺς τῶν μετεωρολόγων λόγους, οἵτινες δόξαν ἀντὶ 
δόξης τὴν μὲν ἀφελόμενοι τὴν δ’ ἐνεργασάμενοι τὰ 
ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄμμασιν 
ἐποίησαν· 
Since persuasion, combined with speech, moulds the 
soul as it wishes, it is necessary, at first, to 
acknowledge the speeches of astronomers who, 
substituting opinion for opinion, thrashing one and 
establishing another, make appear to the eyes of 
opinion what is unreliable and not evident. 
Opinion is therefore directed toward ἄ-δηλα, i.e. ‘what is not 
evident’, which in turn is said to be ἄ-πιστα, i.e. ‘unreliable’, in the 
sense of ‘not worthy of being believed’.28 At this point, it might be 
noted that the whole speech on the reasons why Helen went to Troy 
is precisely a speech on ἄ-δηλα, i.e. a speech referring to an event or 
a fact which is not suitable for being seen or observed.29 
To sum up, in the Palamedes, particularly in paragraphs 5 and 24, 
‘not being’ is defined as ‘what cannot be known’ and ‘what cannot 
be spoken of truly’, so that it coincides with ‘falsehood’. Moreover, 
‘what cannot be known’ is something that ‘cannot be observed’. In 
the Palamedes, the reason why the event denoted – or, better, 
purported to be denoted – by the accusation cannot be observed is 
that it did not even occur; in the Helen, the reason why the event 
successfully denoted by Gorgias’ speech cannot be observed is that 
it took place in a remote past, so that, even though it actually once 
occurred, it, in some sense, has ceased to exist – at least, from the 
 
28 Giombini (2012, 121; 135-136), following MacDowell, remarks that ἄ-δηλα 
might be referring to the ultimate causes of things or phenomena. For present 
purposes, establishing what is the object denoted by ἄ-δηλα is not fundamental, 
because the main point is precisely the connection between “what-is-not-evident” 
(whatever it is) and “opinion”. 
29 This is rightly emphasized by Mauro Serra (2012, 129), who claims: ‘la vicenda 
a cui esso [Gorgias’ speech] fa riferimento è, per definizione, da collocare nella 
sfera dell’aphanes poiché appartiene a un passato a cui non è possibile accedere 
direttamente’. 
20 Rev. Archai (ISSN: 1984-249X), n. 31, Brasília, 2021, e03126. 
 
knowing-subject’s point of view. As I suggested previously, from the 
epistemic point of view, whether the event did occur or not, is not so 
relevant; what is epistemically relevant is whether the event is 
suitable for being known, i.e. observed, or not. 
All in all, on whatever reading, ‘not being’ in the Helen is the Helen 
itself: either we take the Helen as denoting a fictional character, i.e. 
a non-existing entity or we take the Helen as denoting a fact which is 
not suitable for being observed – if the latter is the case, however, 
any speech that purport to refer to it ends up being false, inasmuch as 
it does not arise from knowledge. 
Conclusions 
My aim in this paper has been (briefly) answering the following 
question: ‘what is Gorgias’ not being?’, by taking into account his 
major texts, in order to provide (as far as possible) a unified account 
of ‘not being’. 
In light of what has been said so far, we might say that the answer is, 
at least, twofold, depending on the point of view. Indeed, all the texts 
agree on the conception of ‘not being’ as an undesirable yet 
unavoidable fact of language: roughly, propositions which fail to 
denote are not ruled out as impossible or meaningless. So far, so 
good. However, this basic fact is variously and differently evaluated 
by Gorgias. 
On the one hand, in both the Particular Proof and, partially, the 
Palamedes, this assumption leads to the impossibility of 
distinguishing the onto-epistemic status of propositional content: in 
the Particular Proof, it is stated that it is not possible to say of things 
that they are any more than it is possible to say that they are not; in 
the Palamedes, it is suggested – by means of the aporetic conclusion 
– that it is not actually possible to distinguish between denoting and 
non-denoting propositions. All in all, both texts agree on the 
linguistic nature of ‘not being’. 
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On the other hand, the Palamedes also puts much emphasis on the 
fact that, even though ‘not being’ is suitable for being spoken of, it is 
not, however, suitable for being spoken of truly – due to the fact that 
it is not suitable for being known or, better, observed. 
As unexpected as it is, the conception of ‘not being’ arising in the 
Helen seems to be traced back to that same picture. That is, the Helen 
also revolves around something which cannot be known or observed, 
so that any speech referring to it has its source in a doxastic cognitive 
state, i.e. a cognitive state which lacks knowledge and, therefore, 
which is false. 
In view of this, it seems that we are left with a strong inconsistency 
between the Particular Proof and the epideictic speeches. Such an 
inconsistency, I would say, cannot be ignored or solved, insofar as it 
reflects the more fundamental gap obtaining, according to Gorgias, 
between ‘language’ and ‘knowledge’.30 
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